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I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Apart from campaign finance, federal and state legislators are subject
to antidemocratic internal rules, personal or staff conflicts of interest,
secrecy in deals struck, and information imbalance favoring special,
organized interests. The problem is not confined to Congress, but, in
roughly parallel fashion, affects all fifty state legislatures, which
together consider 150,000 bills annually, 37,000 of which become law—
seventy-five times the number enacted by Congress.1
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS
A. Bias
The most pervasive bias of general concern is favoritism for those
with a proprietary, short-term stake in public policy. Apart from the
campaign finance issue are issues of lobbying, job interchange, and
information access.
1. Legislator Conflicts of Interest
At the federal level as well as in some states, legislators must disclose
personal holdings that might impact their official decisions. What are
the coverage problems in current law? Is disclosure enough of a check?
Note that legislators are often not prohibited from dealing with those
having public business before them. Problems particularly arise with
legislators who are attorneys maintaining law firm ties. Because of the
attorney-client privilege, special interests can often hire legislators or
those close to them without detection. How can such conflicts be
prevented statutorily or otherwise?
2. Job Interchange: The “Deferred Bribe”
Related to the above, many legislators work closely with lobbyists
whose employers have a financial stake in legislative business.
Legislators are commonly hired as lobbyists themselves or are otherwise
hired by such interests after leaving the legislature. It is difficult to
detect a promise to hire made to a legislator while still in office and
casting official votes.

1. See State Action, State Legislatures and Resources, at http://www.cfpa.org/
statemap.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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3. Staff Job Interchange
How do we prevent excessive self-interested bias of legislative staff?
Currently, staff members receive job offers and often leave public
employment for lobbying jobs with profit-stake interests. Should we
require professional staff to refuse for a period of time (one year, two
years, or longer) any employment with a profit-stake interest having
business before the public office he or she serves? Some states ban
former agency officials from appearing before the agency that
previously employed them for one year after employment ends. But is
that enough, given the limited definition of lobbying and the deferred
bribe impact of a job offer made while still in public employ?
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Oaks Model2
One proposed solution is to work in reverse: rather than prohibiting
importuning offers made to a public official, focus on the official.
Under the Oaks model, enacted in three California cities in 2000, public
officials essentially enter into a contract when they take local office. It
provides that public compensation for that office is paid with the
understanding that all decisions made will be “on the merits” and
without regard to the personal financial gain of the public official.
Where such public officials distribute millions or billions of dollars in
public benefits, exemptions, and privileges, they agree to not personally
profit from any person or group that has received substantially
disproportionate public benefits based on their decisions. Hence, a
legislator voting to grant huge subsidies to the dairy industry would
agree that for a period of five years or until two years after leaving that
public office, whichever is longer, he or she will not accept any
honorarium, gift, job, or campaign contribution from a person or
industry benefiting from his or her vote. Decisions are to be made on
the merits.

2. For a copy of an Oaks initiative, see The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer
Rights, Oaks Proposal, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/citizen/rp/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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B. Other Models
Other models require placement of assets in blind trust, prohibit law
practice while serving in public office, or impose conflict of interest
standards closer to those applicable to judges. What alternatives might
accomplish the neutral decisionmaking goal?
IV. INFORMATION AND ADVOCACY IMBALANCE
Even where a legislator lacks personal financial bias and wants to
make a decision on the merits, he or she must have balanced information
from which to decide. That is not currently the case.
A. Lobbying
California has 1600 registered lobbyists.3 Of this total, one full-time
person and one half-time person represent the interests of children.
Several other lobbyists represent service providers who attend to
children in various ways, but their perspective may not be the same as a
long range interest in their clients or customers. Other states have
similar imbalances and, at the federal level, over 20,000 lobbyists ply the
halls of Congress, with very few representing diffuse, disadvantaged, or
future interests.4 Given the complexity of public issues and the press of
business, many public officials view their role as that of mediators
between groups contending for their attention and favor. This “vector”
view of legislators is implicit in the current legislative process federally
and in most states. How can the current imbalance be redressed to allow
our ethical sensibilities toward our children and our legacy to transcend
the advocacy currently extant?
We currently regulate lobbying by requiring certain disclosures and by
generally prohibiting excessive gifts or cash payments by lobbyists
directly to legislators. Does this limitation solve the problem of access
and preferential influence by monied interests?
Some possible solutions to consider include: (1) apply ex parte
restrictions to legislators and elevate the public hearing process; (2)
subsidize charity and nonprofit advocacy, not profit-stake lobbying; and
(3) publicly financed independent information.

3. Cal-Access, Welcome to Lobbying Activity, at http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying/
Lobbyists/calaccess.aspx?letter=A&sort=&session-2001 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
4. Your Congress.com, Lobbyists FAQ, at http://www.yourcongress.com/
ViewArticle.asp?article_id=63 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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1. Apply Ex Parte Restrictions to Legislators; Elevate the Public
Hearing Process
Should legislators operate more like judges, subject to such restrictions as
ex parte contact limitations? Currently, most bills are heard in committees,
where testimony is delivered and exhibits presented. However, much of
the committee process is window dressing while real decisions are made
in offices during visits by lobbyists who have access. These lobbyists
know the background and personal histories of legislators they visit.
They know which buttons to push in privately arguing for or against
legislation. What if hearings were made more meaningful by treating
them more like judicial hearings? Parties are expected to make their
point in public and subject to cross-examination. They do not make
private appeals that can be misleading or would be easily rebuttable if
made in public. Why do we preserve such evidentiary fairness when a
decision by a public official—a judge—is made concerning the rights of
a single litigant, but then eschew it when a decision is made affecting the
rights of millions?
Instead of ex parte contact limitations, should legislators at least be
required to disclose their contacts with parties interested in their official
decisions?
2. Imbalance: Subsidize Charity and Nonprofit Advocacy,
Not Profit-Stake Lobbying
Can we partly redress the current imbalance of advocacy favoring
profit-stake interests? Currently, we allow business and profit interests
to deduct monies spent on lobbying as a “necessary business expense.”5
This means that lobbying by profit-stake interests is twenty to forty
percent subsidized by other taxpayers who must make up the taxes thus
foregone. Meanwhile, lobbying by those who lack a profit-stake, but
whose interest is considered charitable, are denied or limited in their
access to our legislators. Should this not be reversed? Why not end any
deductibility of lobbying expenses and allow an assured percentage,
something like twenty-five to fifty percent of the budget of nonprofit or
charity qualifying entities to be expended for such advocacy?
Should we pay compensation to those who provide information to
legislators on behalf of general, disadvantaged, or future interests? How?
5.

See I.R.C. § 162 (2000).
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3. Publicly Financed Independent Information
One way to moderate the information imbalance is for legislatures to have
their own independent source of information about public policy options.
Such information could come from institutional sources, such as
general accounting offices, little Hoover Commissions, committee or
party staffs, or from competent personal staffs. Should legislators be
required to devote a percentage of their office budgets for such policy
staffing, as opposed to the district and constituent service function upon
which so many of them focus almost exclusively? How can we assure
adequate and independent information from committee staff or from
independent oversight agencies?
B. Impact of Term Limits
What is the impact of term limits on the advocacy and information
imbalance between short-term profit interests and longer-term interests?
On the one hand, such limits may prevent the development of sinecures,
free from public check, and may stimulate new blood and new ideas. On
the other hand, they may make legislators even more dependent on the
current information imbalance and may facilitate much mischief by
outsiders able to manipulate a legislature now lacking an institutional
memory and amenable to shallow sound bite arguments. For example,
California’s short limits—six years in the Assembly and eight years in
the Senate6—combined with cuts in legislative resources for staffing and
information, have made legislators more dependent on outside lobbying
influence, which favors special interests. These term limits have also
magnified the effect of campaign contribution influence, as officials
must gear up for expensive races before new constituencies much more
often. Is there a different term limit formulation that could advance
stated goals without such collateral effect?
V. BYPASSING THE LEGISLATURE
Some states allow the electorate to bypass the legislature by enacting
statutes, and even constitutional amendments, by direct popular vote.
The initiative and referendum process has become an important
democratic safety valve.
However, some problems have impeded the proper functioning of this
process in many states. First, special interests have gained access to the
6. See California the Golden State, Compiled by the Office of the Chief Clerk
Assembly of the State of California, at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/clerk/BILLSLEGIS
LATURE/goldenstate.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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public forum by paying for signatures to qualify propositions. Second,
they respond to most citizen initiated proposals with fake
counterproposals of their own. Third, they spend millions of dollars on
deceptive political advertising, which rarely identifies the actual vested
interest financing the ad.
Another problem with initiatives has been their high rate of court
reversal, usually based on language that might well be corrected if
subjected to the kind of examination that bills receive in the normal
legislative course. However, the inflexible format of initiatives requires
them to be voted upon as stated in the qualifying initiative.
Are there reforms that might strengthen the initiative process without
stimulating its capture by special interests? Can we provide public
legal assistance to petition proponents regarding questions of
constitutionality and consistency with existing law—similar to the
Office of Legislative Counsel available to legislators? Can we treat
volunteer gathering of signatures differently than signatures gathered
by “hired gun” paid collectors? How can we police campaign deceit,
or can we? How can we require identity disclosure of initiative ad
proponents and opponents?7
VI. PUBLIC ACCESS
The internal rules of the legislature inevitably relate to media attention
and public responsiveness. If business is conducted in private, without
public vote, then the special interests that dominate such an environment
will often prevail. California, for example, has a “suspense file”
procedure allowing legislators and the governor to kill bills supported by
the broad population without accountability or public vote.8 How can it
be prevented or countered?
Related to accountability are the sunshine provisions of the Congress
and state legislatures. Many legislatures have exempted themselves
from the same public records and open meeting provisions that they
apply to local governments and executive branch agencies. Why should
they not live by the same standards?
How transparent and fair are the legislative rules themselves? What
7. See, e.g., Cal. Prolife Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal.
1998) (problematic decision analyzing the constitutionality of California’s proposition
208).
8. STANDING R. OF THE ASSEMBLY 58.2, available at http://carecure.rutgers.edu/Quest/
California/Rules%20of%20the%20Assembly#AR58.2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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are the highest priorities for reform in this area?
Anyone who has advocated before any legislature has witnessed the
common arrogance of its membership. Hearings are abruptly canceled
or conducted with little respect for the citizens who wish to comment,
even those who travel hundreds of miles at great cost to tell their stories.
Time limitations may prevent input from everyone who wants to be
heard, but the atmosphere in many state legislatures is deference to
members and longstanding lobbyists along with open disdain for citizens
who are not “heavy hitters.” What can be done to stimulate internal
rules assuring open proceedings, public votes, and accountability?
Are those who represent broad citizen concerns effective lobbyists? A
recent survey of child advocates found them to be relatively impotent
factors in influencing state legislative outcomes. Would a higher level
of professionalism help? How is that accomplished without taking on
the negative attributes of an inside player?
VII. MEDIA ATTENTION
In order for the interests of the impoverished to be advanced,
decisionmakers must be without excessive money based bias, and
information and advocacy must be balanced. But beyond this, the issues
relevant to those interests must be raised. They must be on the public
agenda table. Increasingly, the media sets that agenda. Underrepresented
interests are of concern to the body politic. Elected officials tend to
respond quickly and sensitively to issues raised by the media and
receiving the attention of the populace.
How do we influence the media to address matters of concern to the
dispossessed or to the longer range future? The media is poor at
covering subjects that lack a journalistic “handle,” including social
trends which are gradual, even if massive and important, such as child
poverty or widespread privacy loss. How do we facilitate such coverage
for legislative attention?
In addition to the selection of a legislative agenda, the media is the
critical card available to the public interest advocate when an issue is
before a legislature. It may allow for partial redress of advocacy
imbalance among those lobbying the legislature, and it gives a weapon to
those who lack campaign finance or direct membership assets. How do
we take advantage of it?
Beyond media access, what impact does increasing concentration of
media ownership have on the composition of legislatures and their
publicly driven agendas? Rupert Murdock controls the communications
satellite on three continents and is now negotiating to buy Direct TV,
one of America’s two national satellite systems. Two cable firms
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control the other national satellite system. Cable concentration is
extreme, with local monopolies being the rule, absent meaningful rate
regulation. Two firms, AT&T and Time Warner, now control eighty
percent of the national cable communications market. One of them has
now combined with the nation’s largest Internet service provider, and
both (dominating high speed Internet access) have contended they can
confine consumer choice to their own designated Internet service
provider.9 In combination with the relaxation of cross ownership rules
and the decline of the Fairness Doctrine, the ascension of “free market”
regulators, where a free market is lacking, is particularly dangerous,
given the First Amendment implications extant—all of which may be
momentous as applied to legislative elections and media coverage of the
Congress and state legislatures.
VIII. LOBBYING AND FOUNDATION SUPPORT
Many foundations labor under the misapprehension that their § 501(c)(3)
status absolutely prohibits “lobbying.” It is “political.” In fact, the
absolute ban on political involvement applies to candidate elections.10
The definition of lobbying is relatively narrow under federal and state
law, and a substantial increase in the “education of public officials” from
those without a proprietary stake in public policy is both lawful and
desirable. Why are some foundations afraid? Why do so many seem to
direct funding not to leveraged change, but to pilot projects, studies, and
spending without likely impact? What can be done to make advocacy
funding a part of their agenda?
IX. COMPOSITION
The composition of legislatures turns on elections, entry opportunity,
campaign finance support, redistricting, ease of registration and voting,
voting accuracy, and other democratic mechanisms. What are the
current structural impediments to the election of those legislators, based
on informed exercise of democratic will from the bottom, rather than on
manipulation from incumbents or others at the top?11

9. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
10. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000).
11. See Miles Rapoport, Democracy’s Moment: Can the Debacle of 2000 Ignite a
Movement for the Democratic Renewal?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 12–16, 2001, at 41.
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* * * * *
X. BACKGROUND ON PANELISTS
Matthew Myers is president and chief legal counsel of the Campaign
for Tobacco-Free Kids, a privately funded organization established to
focus the nation’s attention and action on reducing tobacco use among
children. In his previous role as executive vice president, he oversaw all
of the Campaign’s advocacy, outreach, and grassroots development
efforts.
Myers is a nationally recognized tobacco control advocate. In 1996 he
received the “Smokefree America Award,” as the lawyer who made the
greatest contribution to tobacco control efforts in the United States. In
1989 he was awarded the prestigious Surgeon General’s Medallion from
Dr. C. Everett Koop, for contributions to the public health of the nation.
Former FTC chair and author Michael Pertschuk featured Myers’s
legislative advocacy efforts in his book, The Giant Killers.12
He joined the Campaign after a fifteen-year partnership in the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Asbill, Junkin & Myers, where he
specialized in complex commercial litigation and cases concerning
employment law, the Privacy Act, health law, and First Amendment
issues. First as staff director and then as counsel to the Coalition on
Smoking or Health, an organization comprised of the American Cancer
Society, the American Lung Association, and the American Heart
Association, he has testified before Congress and agencies of the
executive branch.
Jamie Court is executive director for the nonprofit Foundation for
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California. He is the
author of Making A Killing: HMOs and the Threat to Your Health.13 In
1994 Court, along with consumer advocate Harvey Rosenfield, established
Consumers for Quality Care, the health care watchdog project of the
Foundation, to protect the public interest in high quality health care.
Court was named “Consumer Educator of the Year” by the Consumer
Attorneys Association of Los Angeles in 1998 and “Patient Rights
Advocate of the Year” in 1996 by Consumer Attorneys of California.
He is a frequent media commentator and contributor. Prior to his
insurance reform efforts, Court was a homeless advocate and community
organizer. He is a graduate of Pomona College in Claremont, California.
Charles Halpern was the founding president of the Nathan Cummings
Foundation from 1989 through November 2000. The Foundation’s areas
12. MICHAEL L. PERTSCHUK, GIANT KILLERS 53–54, 56–61 (1986).
13. JAMIE COURT, MAKING A KILLING: HMOS AND THE THREAT TO YOUR HEALTH
(1999), available at http://www.makingakilling.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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of interest are health, the arts, the environment, and Jewish life.
He is the chair of the boards of the Center for Contemplative Mind in
Society and Dēmos: A Network for Ideas and Action. Beginning in
March 2001, he will divide his time between Berkeley, California, and
New York City.
The founding dean of CUNY Law School, Halpern was also a founder
of the Center for Law and Social Policy in the 1970s, a seminal center of
public interest advocacy. He helped to create the Mental Health Law
Project and has taught at Georgetown and Stanford law schools.
Gene Kimmelman, co-director of Consumers Union’s Washington,
D.C. office, is responsible for management of the office, as well as
oversight of all federal advocacy issues. He has extensive expertise in a
wide variety of public policy issues, including telecommunications,
cable television, product liability, antitrust law, and health care.
Kimmelman is a recognized expert on deregulation and consumer
protection issues, particularly in the area of telecommunications. He
was the lead consumer advocate on the Omnibus Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and was successful in advocating the addition of significant
consumer protections to the telecommunications deregulation legislation.
Prior to joining Consumers Union, Kimmelman served for two years
as chief counsel and staff director for the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Prior to that, he was legislative director for
the Consumer Federation of America, where he directed CFA’s
legislative, regulatory, and judicial intervention program. He began his
career as a consumer advocate and staff attorney for Public Citizen
Congress Watch.
Wendy Wendlandt is the national political director for the National
Association of State Public Interest Research Groups (PIRG) and has
held that position since 1992. In this capacity, Wendlandt has assisted
many of the state PIRGs in developing and running campaigns,
including CalPIRG’s 1996 campaign finance reform ballot initiative,
proposition 212,14 which called for $100 contribution limits to
candidates. She was also a principal advisor in the effort that same year
to gather 1.5 million signatures to qualify proposition 212 and three
additional measures for the California ballot.
In 2000, she and the state PIRGs, along with six other organizations,
14. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 42–47 (1996),
available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2003).
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launched Genetically Engineered Food Alert, the national call for a
moratorium on the use of genetically engineered crops and ingredients
until they are safety tested, labeled, and under which companies that
produce them are held liable for any damages. The GE Food Alert
Campaign was responsible for uncovering the illegal use of Starlink corn
in taco shells, among 500 other products. In 1999, Wendlandt also
helped to found the Genetic Engineering Action Network (GEAN) as the
U.S. network of genetic engineering activists, and she continues to chair
its steering committee.
She has been with the PIRGs since 1984, working in a variety of
capacities, including serving as the executive director of the PIRG in
Washington State, where she played key roles in two statewide ballot
measure campaigns—one to establish a state toxic waste Superfund
cleanup program and one to stop Hanford from becoming the nation’s
first high level nuclear waste dump site—and led legislative efforts on a
variety of public interest issues, including motor voter registration and
pesticide reduction.
Wendlandt is a trustee of the Green Century Funds, the nation’s only
family of socially responsible mutual funds founded and owned by
nonprofit environmental organizations. She is on the board of Green Corps,
the field school for environmental organizing, and has served as one of
its lead trainers since its inception in 1991. She also serves as the associate
director for CalPIRG, the California Public Interest Research Group.
She has a B.A. in Political Science from Whitman College, 1983.
XI. PANEL DISCUSSION15
MATTHEW MYERS:
We are going to discuss this in dialogue form. The critical question is:
“What are the impediments to Congress, state legislatures, and other
elected bodies doing the business of the public rather than the narrow
special interests?”
We’re here today to try to figure out how we look at the combination
of the legislative rules and the public action steps that are necessary to
overcome these problems. What we’re going to try to do is to divide our
conversation into two broad themes. The first is a look at the insider
rules themselves. What are the rules at the congressional, state, and
local levels that both enhance our ability to influence the process and
15. This Part has been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing and to identify significant sources when first referred to by the
speakers.
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inhibit our ability to influence the process?
Second, we’re going to ask ourselves the question of how to become
more effective at influencing the process itself because we must
remember that the people we are influencing are different than judges
and administrative heads. They are not appointed, but are ultimately
accountable to the people. That makes our advocacy itself quite
different.
Let me start with a question and open it up for a dialogue. What are
the major rule impediments? What are the major rules that we need to
change on the inside of the legislative process if we’re going to make it
more responsive to the public interest? Wendy, do you want to begin?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Sure, I think I get to start because the states have some of the worst
rules in allowing public interest voices to be heard. All you need to do is
visit Chuck Lewis’s web site at the Center for Public Integrity16 to see
how terrible the states fare in terms of disclosure. Half the states require
literally no disclosure of the financial interests of their legislators.
The second reason is because of the sheer volume of legislation passed
through state legislatures. It is about seventy-five times the number of
laws passed in the Congress. In 1999 about 150,000 bills were
introduced at the state level, and about a quarter of those became law.17
So we are talking about a lot of legislative action that obviously affects
the public every single day.
In terms of the rules, our experience in state legislatures across the
country includes an overall dominant problem of committee chairs and
leadership able to block the process—so a bill never moves anywhere.
That is probably the single biggest problem and probably the problem
that is most difficult to resolve.
But we can do something about other things. For example, we could
require disclosure of every type of document through radio, television,
and the Internet. It is our tax dollars at work creating these documents;
and, in order to shed a little light on the process, putting that material on
the web or in other public forums seems essential.
The third thing is access to the process—making sure we have
16. See The Center for Public Integrity, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
dtaweb/home.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
17. See State Action, State Legislatures and Resources, at http://www.cfpa.org/
statemap.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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effective open meetings acts, including requiring advance disclosure of
meeting times and prohibiting last minute changes. It may seem
shocking to some of you who deal with more progressive states like
California or with the Congress, but, in many states, the meetings are
changed at the last minute, and attendees are not even told in what room
the hearing is happening. So we are talking about basic reforms here.
The fourth thing that I had on my list is basic ethics. Crucial are
conflict provisions ranging from recusal, where a legislator has a conflict
of interest, to banning gifts and bribes. Again, the range of these laws
across the country is striking.
The next area of needed reform is the recording of votes. Again, this
would seem a simple concept, but the recording of votes in committee or
on the floor is often lacking. Many times, we have floor votes by voice,
where nobody can identify individual votes. So we need to get votes
recorded.
The last thing on my list is a little more obscure: being able to force a
floor vote on an issue. We need to push issues out to the floor so they
don’t just end up in a suspense file or in some committee—the dead bills
committee. Almost every state has something like that.
Those are some quick things that would help us get access to the
process. Now, it does not fundamentally change the amount of money
coming into the process or the amount of power we necessarily have in
it, but those are just some simple things that we should be working to get
into states across the country.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Could I just probe a couple of them? You started off with the
disclosure of documents. Since legislatures, unlike courts, don’t have to
have a formal record before they act and often don’t have any record
whatsoever, tell me a little bit more what you think in terms of
disclosure of documents. I can’t tell you the number of bills I’ve worked
on in which, two years out, there is no record of the legislative history.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Right. Some of them are simple. If there has been a public hearing,
there ought to be a transcript, particularly in a big state such as
California. Down here in San Diego, it might cost up to $250 to fly up
to Sacramento round trip, even if the ticket is purchased three weeks in
advance. The transcript of the hearing ought to be available on a Web
site. Some of the reforms are simple. These things are already public,
but are not distributed to a wide group of people.
Another example would be lobby disclosure forms: financial interest,
financial stake in companies, that type of information. In many places it
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is filed, but very difficult to access, and with the advent of the Internet,
we ought to be able to just post that information. In Congress, Gary
Ruskin has been pushing this, to have congressional research documents
available for public consumption. As I understand it, those are only
available to congressional staff. Seventy-five million dollars or so is
spent to produce those reports, which are actually quite good, and yet
members of the public cannot get them without help from a staff person.
So even though these documents are already produced, we need to
expand their dissemination.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Would you change the rules about the kind of evidence or the kind of
information the Congress or legislature has to have before they act?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I suppose that would be good. It is a little bit like campaign finance
reform. What could we actually get in the next ten years? I would think
that the more information about legislative history, the better. The idea
that, here in California, Steve Peace, the primary author of the California
deregulation bill, is now trying to refashion himself as the savior of the
energy crisis is appalling. It would be good to have on record some of
the legislative history that led us to the fiasco in the first place.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Gene, you work at the federal level. Do you want to comment at all
on this issue?
GENE KIMMELMAN:
Yes, a number of things Wendy mentioned just now are being
considered in Congress to make all documents available, and that is
something that the public interest community ought to be very involved
in. It’s not a sexy issue, but it’s obviously an essential one. My reaction
is that we have many of the things the states are lacking, to some extent,
at the federal level. Surely they need to be perfected there. So I start off
with the reaction that these are really necessary, and there is an awful lot
of work that needs to be done here. We are not close to making the
public interest community more effective or making legislative bodies
more responsive to us. Maybe, in some instances, we ought to question
exactly how far we want to push, as opposed to other use of our resources.

81

PRINTERLEGISLATIVE REFORM.DOC

1/15/2020 3:44 PM

At the federal level there are committee reports with pretty strong
disclosure requirements, like disclosure of financial interests and ethics
rules—a little squishy. Or maybe very squishy. But at least there is
disclosure—public access to that information. A lot of the votes are
recorded, not by requirement, but by tradition and political pressure. So
many things are already available at the federal level, and yet there are
some of the same fundamental problems that exist at the state level in
meeting public interest needs.
But there are some twists here, including the ability of committee
chairmen to block bills. It has certainly been a tradition in the House of
Representatives, and yet there is a way around it called a “discharge
petition,” a very effective tool to identify who wants to supersede the
power of a chairman. I raise questions about how far we want to go
down this path of democracy, because Republicans, as opposed to
Democrats, have used it very effectively.
Then, there is the filibuster rule in the Senate, which senators use to
block a bill on the Senate floor. A supermajority vote is required to
overcome a filibuster. In my experience of twenty years of doing this,
our policy allies often use filibusters to block extremely dangerous
legislation, yet filibusters are also used very efficiently by our
opponents. It is an extremely difficult problem to surpass.
But the U.S. Senate is a good example where, even with committee
chairmen blocking bills in committee and refusing to hear bills, there is a
chance, somewhere along the line, to raise those provisions on the
Senate floor because of procedural openings. So there are always
opportunities in the Senate. But Congress, nevertheless, has many of the
same resulting problems that the states have in passing public interest
legislation.
So we can identify improvements that need to be made at the federal
level. But some of these would take great effort, and I suggest that we
may be better off redirecting our efforts at substantive matters, and not
just the procedural rules.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Wendy, how much do the type of rules that you are talking about truly
serve as an impediment at the state level?
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WENDY WENDLANDT:
It is difficult to say. PIRG is in a big expansion right now, adding
advocates in many new states. So we are moving into states that we
have not worked in before. What is difficult about it is that some of the
rules aren’t even written down; so new advocates in the state legislature
have a difficult time figuring out how the thing works. So it is an
impediment in the sense that an advocate literally can’t figure out how to
run a campaign because it is unclear where it goes next and what rules
might block the campaign along the way.
There are obviously huge other problems, like being outspent by our
opposition. Campaign finance influences who is elected in the first
place because of big money donors. So it is a little difficult to say in the
scheme of things what percentage of the problem this is. But clearly,
each place where we are getting pushed back is a problem for the public
interest community.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
I wanted to add to this. When we get past looking at just what is
required and what information is available, there is a separate access
issue that is truly a phenomenal development in Congress—the inability
to get into hearings. People, real people, cannot get into hearings. There are
so many line sitters starting in the wee hours of the morning when the
buildings are opened—the buildings where these public hearings are
being held—who are being paid by corporate interests to sit there until
the lobbyists show up five minutes before the hearings start, so that they
can have access to the public room. Unless there are people who want to sleep
there or who have extra staff or nothing else to do with their time, people
in the public interest community, or even those in the general public who
see a hearing notice, are never going to get in. That is one of the most
fundamental access problems today—another form of money in politics.
CHARLES HALPERN:
Let me just add this one point. You asked, Matt, how big an
impediment this is at the state level, and I think that is an important
question. But in some ways it is a question that is too limiting. Even if
the answer were that there is no impediment at all, we ought to be
thinking about what an ideal legislative process would look like ten
years from now, twenty years from now. And if we had some image of
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a legislative process that we were working toward, that would help us set
priorities, as Gene suggested we are going to have to do, not because of
the immediate impediment, but because we have some vision of what the
world should look like. I think that was touched on with the last panel
with respect to campaign finance.
If we start with something small like the McCain-Feingold bill, we
may end up with a system in which the process is much more open to
challenges to incumbents, in which Fanny Lou Hamer is going to be
running for the Alabama legislature. I think one of the ways that we, in
the public interest world, can deepen and make our work more effective
is to be thinking ahead of the crisis.
MATTHEW MYERS:
It is interesting, Charlie, and one of the questions I would ask as we
think about the perfect legislative process. One thing that struck me in
listening to Wendy’s suggestions, is that I could probably craft the
perfect procedural legislative process, and then still ask myself the
question at the end of the day whether the process will work for the
people in it. That does seem to be a fundamental question. It is clearly
not a reason not to seek the perfect legislative process, but it is a reason
to say how much energy should be spent on those issues.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Right. But I think the whole question is around the tools of
democracy. We are so incredibly outspent, and it gets worse and worse
every year, so that we need as many tools as we possibly can to have
some parity in some set of circumstances. That is the current situation,
and that would not be my ideal world, but that is the situation we are in.
So anything that provides more democracy is always better for us.
MATTHEW MYERS:
And Gene was against more democracy?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
No, I know, that’s why I am looking at Gene, because we hear the
word “initiative,” and people are concerned about the initiative process.
The initiative process is something that maybe has gotten out of control.
But I’m just firm in this: the more democracy the better because we are
really screwed if more democracy is not good for the public interest.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
Just to clarify, I’m for it. I think there are a lot of other things, given
our resources, that we need to focus on before we get to that long-term
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issue because, unless we can bridge the gap between us and the huge
powers that be, procedural changes may not deliver us what we want.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Before we move on to that issue, let me pose a broader question.
Unlike in a court, where everything that takes place has to take place in a
public recorded form, much of the legislative process takes place in a
member’s office, or between two members walking down the hallway,
or a member trading off an issue of concern to his or her constituency for
another person’s constituency. How would you address those issues, if
at all? Because if we are going to talk about making the process
transparent, and therefore open, we still have to recognize that
bargaining takes place. Any suggestions?
JAMIE COURT:
The only way you can really deal with it is by going to the outside and
bringing the outside in. We had an issue with a legislator a couple of
years ago who promised an insurance agent he would vote against a bill
even though he agreed with it, so we had to make it public. The
legislator still hasn’t talked to us, but we went after him in his district
and got press. That is what the outside game right now is. The other
side, the corporations, have figured this out, which is why they’ve
invested heavily in “astroturf technology”18—which is incredible
lobbying technology.
We had some bills to make “claims practices” for the insurance
industry a little cleaner, and one of the ways the insurance industry tried
to stop our efforts was by having an 800 number system where they
literally hooked people up to their respective legislator’s office. All
policyholders in the state were informed by mailed notice to “call this
800 number,” and they got hooked up to the legislator’s office to leave a
message. They logged an inordinate amount of calls because of the
money they spent to do that. They brought the outside in.
We don’t have that type of money, but what we do have is the
initiative process in California. In other places, we have the ability to
work on building some grassroots capacity in order to make legislators
pay from the outside. Any facilities that create more opportunities for
18. The term “astroturf technology” refers to artificial grass roots support and
concern manipulated by special interests.
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empowering people on the outside are important. Our group has worked
mostly on the outside through the initiative process in California. I have
been involved in different issues, and it is interesting how the initiative,
even when it doesn’t pass, even when it doesn’t succeed, can leverage
pressure inside the legislature. The most recent example is California’s
energy crisis. In the winter we were going very quickly toward a
solution that would give the utilities and the energy producers almost
everything they wanted. In November we announced that our group was
going to do an initiative to create a public power authority and place a
windfall profits tax on power generators. Suddenly, the Governor
changed his direction, and ever since we have been fighting a war to
capture the Governor’s attention and to go in a proper direction. The
only reason we have any leverage to do that, the only reason the
Governor is listening to us—and he doesn’t call that often—is because
we threatened an initiative on the ballot when he was up for re-election.
Basically, that initiative would have suggested that he didn’t do a good
enough job with the crisis, so we had to go directly to the people. That
type of leverage, that type of power, is the ultimate power. There are
ways that the initiative process has worked against people of average
means because it is corruptible by money, and I hope we will get to that
a little later, but it is one of the ultimate outside weapons.
So I would agree with Gene that we need to find a way to bring more
people from the outside into the process. One of the ways we have done
it is a group called the Oaks Project, which is part of the Foundation for
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights. This is something that Ralph Nader
inspired in a speech he gave in Thousand Oaks, California, where he
said we need a thousand Californians, rooted in their community, strong
and sturdy as the California Oak, who will be citizen activists in their
community and hold legislators accountable. Each of these Oaks agrees
to fifteen hours a month of volunteer time, signature gathering, letter
writing, and lobbying. That is a pretty significant commitment for people
who work, which is why our number is in the hundreds rather than in the
thousands. But what they just did in several cities in California was
pretty amazing. They passed local initiatives in Vista, San Francisco,
Santa Monica, Pasadena, and Clairemont that say any city official who
votes to award a contract, or votes to confer a public benefit of
substantial value on a private person, cannot take a dollar, a job, or even
a campaign contribution from that person for five years after the benefit
is given. Now that is the toughest campaign finance reform law in the nation,
and it is law in five cities right now. The only reason it worked was
because of the initiative process. The Oaks had to collect about 75,000
signatures, all volunteer signatures. The general public does not hear
about it much, but bringing in volunteers creates a new type of attention.
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So I would agree with Gene that the more our groups can focus on the
capacity issue, on bringing the average citizenry into what we do, the
more leverage we’ll have—as opposed to focusing just on procedural
rules.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Well, Matt, there is one other area which is sort of halfway between
outside organizing and procedural rules, and that is campaign finance
reform and electoral reform. As to the latter, reforms range from
changing the size of legislative districts so they are smaller for more
accountability, to instant runoff voting so people can rank their
candidates, which would allow third party candidates to have an impact
without sacrificing the second choice candidates preferred by a majority
of voters. These other things are not inside procedural rules, but they
would change the composition of the legislature advantageously.
JAMIE COURT:
There is also “none of the above,” which is an interesting notion.
Voters could choose “none of the above” and axe both candidates to get
higher quality in future choices; this is something that we have delved
into in the past.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Do you think the Oaks Project initiative that you actually passed in
several cities would work at the legislative level where campaigns are
far more expensive? In essence, what legislators are asked to do in those
communities is to not benefit a campaign contributor—terrific idea.
Would it work in a campaign to raise millions of dollars?
JAMIE COURT:
One of the hopes for the Oaks Project was that these people would
ultimately become public interest candidates in their communities. And,
if we’re talking at a state assembly or state senator level, hopefully they
would become known and have some type of persona that was
recognizable, and they wouldn’t need millions in campaign funding to
get elected. That hasn’t panned out yet. We are in the early stages of
the project, and we have mixed results. In terms of the systemic process,
the Oaks are trying to create new standards for candidates. For instance,
we had an interesting demonstration outside the office of the California
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Assembly Speaker, Bob Hertzberg. We called him “Bailout Bob” for
some actions he took to bail out the utility industry. Such actions do
slow down bad legislation because Hertzberg had some higher
ambitions. I think it has an effect.
Just in terms of the initiative process, for instance, we are going to the
legislature this year to try to get a new standard for initiative politics.
There is a problem with the initiative process being corrupted by
corporations who put initiatives on themselves under the guise of
campaign committees that sound like they are citizen committees. Also,
we wanted to create a new standard, called the “Volunteer Qualified
Initiative.” This VQI would be as follows: if an initiative qualifies on a
volunteer basis, it gets special ballot designation on anything the
Secretary of State puts out, and it also could qualify for special state
money. In California, we’re talking about turning in about 700,000
volunteer qualified signatures, so that is an awful lot—more than seven
times what we did with our six Oaks local initiatives. But that is a very
high standard. And the Oaks are trying to create this next level in terms
of candidates and initiatives. So I think it is like raising the bar by
example in many ways.
Playing in the current game, I don’t think we have a chance. I think if
we change the rules of the game we have a chance. But changing the
rules is going to be more by new models that are volunteer oriented in
action and getting new types of candidates out there. It is very difficult.
We faced one legal challenge to our initiative, in Vista, where the court
of appeal reversed an adverse preliminary injunction from the trial court,
but it is not clear that this is going to be the end of it. So we do not
know what is going to happen in the end.
MATTHEW MYERS:
How many states have the initiative process? Do you know?
JAMIE COURT:
That is a good question.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
About twenty-four, I think. But that kind of mixes in referendum
states, which are not always as good because that is strictly by way of
referral from the legislature to the ballot.
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MATTHEW MYERS:
And how significant is that process, Wendy, in holding legislatures
accountable?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I think it is incredibly important, judging from our PIRG experience in
the states where we have the initiative process. It is no coincidence that
those states tend to be more public interest oriented states. In those
states where we have the initiative process, we get better legislation out
of the legislature, in addition to the passage of laws through the initiative
process.
JAMIE COURT:
Let me also say that it helps hold candidates to campaign pledges,
because we had an initiative in 1996 on HMO reform.19 It was the first
HMO reform initiative in the nation to deal with the Patients’ Bill of
Rights. It pioneered that slogan: “Doctors, not bureaucrats, should be
practicing medicine.” What that did as a test run was raise the issue in
California. In 1999 Governor Davis signed legislation that was almost
identical to that initiative.20 The initiative started in 1996 to raise some
issues. It failed because people didn’t understand the HMO concept; it
went to the legislature for a couple of years where Governor Wilson
vetoed bill after bill. But it helped to create a public consciousness. By
the time Governor Davis took office, there was this whole culture
supporting that proposal, and he signed it relatively quickly after taking
office. He really didn’t have a choice—it had its own momentum. So
there is a way to use the initiative process to publicly raise issues that
then become very important for candidates. I think it has been very
powerful.
One example of such populist impact is in proposition 13,21 which is
an awful initiative. It limits the tax base and creates radical disparities in
the tax burden between property owners—favoring older, wealthier
property owners. Many people may know about it, but it brought into
19. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 52–57 (1996), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124960 (West Supp. 2003).
21. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 56–60 (1978), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1978p.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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town a whole era of politicians on the other side of the equation—who
were not particularly good for California. They rode in on the coattails
of the initiative. Similarly, proposition 103,22 which our Foundation’s
president authored, was an insurance reform initiative in 1988. It
brought in a lot of people to Sacramento who were pledged to hold the
insurance industry accountable. So the coattails of these initiatives
really do affect candidates.
MATTHEW MYERS:
How ready is the public interest community to effectively use the
initiative process? It involves skills, tactics, and numbers that are
different than what we are used to using.
JAMIE COURT:
Yes, I think it is like engaging in political warfare. The public interest
community is not used to engaging in warfare on that scale. It is used to
engaging on issues, but not in challenging the system. I think that there
are some things that will help it in the coming years. One factor that
could break this whole issue open is electronic signatures. One of the
things the corporations did for us in Washington, D.C., was to pass a
new Electronic Signature Act, so they are as valid as a live signature.
Well, apparently many people think that will apply to signing an
initiative. So this will help all of your groups that have a lot of e-mail
activists who will not show up to a meeting or gather a signature, but
will respond to an e-mail. If they register their signature electronically
and there is a very good idea for an initiative, that also can qualify for all
volunteer qualified initiatives. But we are probably going to have to
stop changes in the law designed to stop that opportunity because it is
too good a deal.
MATTHEW MYERS:
That is where the filibuster comes in handy.
JAMIE COURT:
To qualify an initiative in the absence of a volunteer base, at one
dollar per signature, would cost $700,000. Even once on the ballot, it is
very easy to get a “no” vote on an initiative—people like to vote “no”
because they feel deceived by the process. So until we have higher
standards to sort out these initiatives, like the Good Housekeeping Seal
22. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 98–101, 140–44 (1988),
available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2003).
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of Approval or the “Volunteer Qualified Initiative,” it is difficult for
people to sort through them. In California it must be a very simple
initiative written in a few sentences that people can read, and it must
have a very good ballot summary—so we have to have a good attorney
general to give it a good ballot summary. All the gods have to be
aligned. It is very difficult to get out a message about an initiative that is
not simple or something people readily understand. I think it clearly can
be done on issues that are simple. Electricity, for example, is an issue
where you would not need a lot of money. The message is already there,
and if certain types of people support an initiative on the ballot, the
message will be disseminated.
But without issues that are not in the forefront, I think it is very
difficult for the public interest community to get out those messages. I
think one of the things we could talk about is building capacity to get
messages out. That is something that our group has really focused on:
HMOs, electricity, real populist issues. But other groups in the public
interest community do not focus enough on shaping messages, and using
very strong messages, as a way of changing politics. We should be
creating the message and then following it with legislation, rather than
starting with the legislation to create a message that may never get big
enough in that forum to pass legislation.
MATTHEW MYERS:
You talked about the situation where an industry flooded the
legislature with phone calls from the 800 number, and you said that we
do not have the resources to do that. Then, when you started talking
about the initiative, you talked about what we had to learn how to do as a
movement. And, I’m struck that the public interest community is often
dependent on far too few people and traditional skills in doing what we
do. We have not been as creative or quick as the corporate community
in using the tools out there. There are now enormous low cost
opportunities to get our message out using the Internet, using electronic
communications. And those 800 numbers—they are a lot cheaper today
than they used to be. We need to begin exploring ways to do those
things, because we can do the same things. Our organization has shut
down the phone system in three separate state legislatures with quick
campaigns because our message is, in fact, a more powerful one, and we
do have more constituents out there. We have that funny thing on our
side; it’s actually the truth.
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Our organization is using a combination of radio advertising and
phone banking that has inexpensively changed the dynamic in a number
of legislatures fairly quickly. The real lesson that we still come back to
is: what are the guts of the legislative process? Is it that people have to
go home and face a constituency? We have not done a very good job at
making them think their constituency is not only supportive of us
(because we all know how to do polling), but cares enough about what
we are doing to be watching, active, and ultimately, of course, to do the
critical thing—to act at the voting booth. I think we spend far too little
time talking about strategies to do those things better. Unless we do that,
we can have all the rules we want, but if a member can vote ultimately
the way they want to vote, then it is meaningless.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Right. We spend much more of our time on the outside game than on
those inside rules. I point them out because they are a big problem. But
it boils down to capacity, so you must have the resources. These 800
numbers, they cost money. We have to be able to do it, so we need to
have capacity. And it is training and teaching the people the skills that it
takes to do this work effectively, so that we are not expending energy
without getting good product. We also need to pay attention to
targeting. In terms of a legislative campaign, we are not going to
convince the entire legislature, so we really have to figure out who the
targets are early on in a legislative campaign. Who are the people with
us? Who are the people opposed? Who are the people in the middle?
Then how are we going to move the people in the middle? It may be a
field campaign, because we have the resources to do it, or there are more
creative options for somebody who is particularly intransigent. We have
done all kinds of crazy things: fish dogging candidates—sending giant
fish into their districts on clean water battles. We did that in a campaign
to pass a bill in the California Legislature; we chose five districts and we
just followed those candidates everywhere with those fish. Then, in the
legislature we lobbied the larger set of people. But that kind of thinking
about strategy and resources, I don’t think it is something we are
particularly facile at doing.
CHARLES HALPERN:
Let me suggest that we, as lawyers, are not very facile at these things.
We are here under the auspices of a law school talking about public
interest law, not the public interest. I think this discussion underlines for
me how far the public interest law movement has come and how modest
we lawyers have to be in assessing what our contribution is within this
larger movement. I think, Jamie, your comments about the work on the
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outside suggest there is a very important role for lawyers in seeing
opportunities and drafting documents. But public interest lawyers have
to collaborate in a much larger process, in a movement toward democratic
reform, which has both a legislative and a popular dimension.
The early successes of public interest law were almost exclusively in
the courts, and the skills of lawyers were obviously relevant. One reason
for those early successes was the element of surprise. The lawyers for
the big corporations did not expect to have environmental advocates
making sophisticated arguments under NEPA (the National Environmental
Policy Act)23 when it was first passed. But when we start talking about
our participation in the democratic renewal movement, then we have to
think more specifically about how we, as lawyers, contribute. In some
ways we are less capable at the jobs of community organizing than
people without a law degree. It is, to some extent, a handicap.
The other thing I want to highlight is the fact that we have been
talking about the public interest law community as if we knew what that
meant. I want to suggest that there is at least some strong evidence that
no public interest law community now exists. Bob Fellmeth and I were
talking earlier about other gatherings similar to this one to bring together
the public interest law community, and he could not think of any. And I
could remember only the one that we ran at the Center for Law and
Social Policy in 1971. So that is a thirty-year hiatus since this
community has come together. And without going into too much
history, in 1971 it was a very contentious gathering. I am sure this
gathering is going to have a smoother end than that one did. There, you
had welfare rights advocates, such as George Wiley, simply blowing up
at environmental advocates. While our contention was that there was a
public interest law community, many of the discussants did not see it
that way.
So I think we have to be more self-conscious about this, and, as we
think about how to move forward, we should be thinking about how to
build a sense of community among public interest lawyers. Few people
here, except when they come to a conference like this, identify
themselves as public interest lawyers. Most of us identify ourselves as
environmental lawyers, health lawyers, lawyers for the poor, lawyers for
children, or lawyers for the elderly. If we could build some consciousness
23. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-90, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.).
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of a public interest law community and of those institutions which bring
the public interest law community together, it would be a great
achievement.
One example of such an institution today is the Alliance for Justice, in
Washington, D.C. It is one of the few places where, on an ongoing
basis, these diverse communities of the public interest law movement
come together and work on common matters. And—surprise—there is
no shortage of matters of common interest that unify everybody. Some
of you read today that the Bush Administration is altering the process by
which the federal judges are selected, in a way which will close out the
American Bar Association and leave the Administration freer to appoint
real conservative ideologues to the federal bench. This is an issue in
which everyone who is in the public interest law movement has a stake.
We should be thinking about how we can identify those kinds of issues.
Campaign finance reform is another one. We all have a stake in that
issue. We should be identifying those things and thinking about how we
work together on those matters of common interest.
What if, for example, a large and well-funded environmental organization
designated one person on their staff to work on issues of common
concern and other organizations followed the same route? We might be
able to build a critical mass for a sense of a public interest law
community that actually acts on behalf of shared interest.
JAMIE COURT:
Let me make a case for communication, too. When we passed this
Oaks campaign financing conflict of interest initiative in Pasadena, we
then had to defend it in court. Pasadena went to join another city in court,
so we turned to a center that was a panelist earlier for legal help. It turned
out they could not help us because they were already consulting with the
Mayor of the city of Pasadena. That said to the activists in the community
that this public interest lawyer was not on the side of the community’s
interest in campaign finance reform. So I think one of the things that
needs to be done is to create some communication about where the outside
efforts will merge with the inside efforts and with the interests of the
public interest community at large, because it was really disheartening to
have that happen. We had to spend $10,000 to actually have a lawyer
defend us. So it is important, it is really important, that as everybody
walks away from this conference, people make an effort to communicate
about what is going on, about whatever vital issues are identified here as a
common cause, and it is rather easy to do that electronically. I don’t know
if anyone has set up a list server for the public interest community, but it
might be a wonderful byproduct of this conference.
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GENE KIMMELMAN:
Beyond communications, I think Charlie is talking about something
more fundamental here that is very important. There are so many issues
that are invisible to us with our own blinders on; Charlie mentioned a
few. Here is a stray one: everyone is talking about using the Internet
electronically to communicate with everyone else and about how it has
been a wonderful, open system. Everyone uses a telephone wire, which
the telephone company cannot control. But the cable companies, which
have a fatter wire that can offer television service with their Internet
services, are increasingly dominating the new high speed Internet. After
numerous regulatory legal efforts before Congress, and through merger
review, we have been unsuccessful at requiring it to be opened. A cable
company can have its own company that dominates its high speed pipe
with no obligations to the public, leaving no choice and no rate
regulation. Now, it is a telecommunications issue, it is a media issue,
but it is an issue that could affect everyone’s ability to use these new
technologies for public participation, for democratic action. We need to
put information out about what this means. We need more involvement
in these fundamental infrastructure issues. They are, I think, almost
comparable to campaign financing.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I want to add one other thing to Charlie’s comments. I know from my
experience from working with PIRG and doing a lot of recruitment at
law schools that looking for graduating third-year law students who want
to come and do public interest work is difficult. By and large, they do
not understand public interest advocacy. Ralph Nader addressed one of
the questions, discriminatory justice. My experience with graduating
law students is that legal services is their vision of what being a public
interest lawyer is all about.
And I fear that if we build a network of public service attorneys, we
will quickly return to the screaming and shouting between the welfare
people and the environmental people. There is a fundamental lack of
understanding about what I always refer to as “Nader public interest
advocacy.” There are not a lot of graduating law students who think
they are going to protect consumers’ rights to have access to cable. It is
not taught at law school. They do not understand it. They do not
understand why an attorney would do that. Attorneys litigate, attorneys
work for law firms, attorneys don’t lobby in the legislature. So I feel
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like there is a gulf in the definition of a public interest attorney, and our
wing of the public interest movement is losing. The National Association
of Public Interest Law (NAPIL) was set up with the very purpose of
doing this, of introducing law students to the idea of public interest
advocacy and getting them into it. The legal services wing of the public
interest movement has largely overtaken it. I am not an attorney, so this
is more my layperson activist’s view of what the law community thinks
of itself.
MATTHEW MYERS:
I think your comments complement what Charlie said. Part of the
problem is not just that the public interest community does not
communicate, but that we have not advanced the public interest law
community. That is in part because people coming out of law school
only think of public interest lawyers as doing litigation. Yet, as the
world has moved, public interest law is much, much more than litigation.
The sort of legislative skills in which many of us are engaged are a very
a critical component. Lawyers may not be great organizers, but they are
absolutely critical skilled professionals as part of the overall team. We
are not doing enough to help the young lawyers (1) have an opportunity
for growth in that career arena, (2) see its impact and its value, and (3)
see why it requires the most skilled among us.
One of the things that we all need to be doing better is recruiting the
best and the brightest by making our work as attractive as it was to us
when we were mentored by a number of the people on this panel some
years ago and encouraged to go into these fields. We are not doing
enough of that because we are not demonstrating how that track is
meaningful, how it does affect public policy—putting real live faces on
the results. One of the things that I say to a lot of groups is that
campaign finance reform is the perfect example. We are never going to
sell it on esoteric principles of democracy, because that may interest
every single person in this room, but it is not going to energize a whole
host of people out there. Unless we make those issues real, in terms of
the daily life of people, we are not going to energize the broad numbers
necessary.
JAMIE COURT:
I think that is important when we teach young lawyers or when we go
back to law school to teach public interest law—to teach politics,
political power, and public opinion. Because, you are absolutely right, if
we look at what the Supreme Court did recently, it basically said the
right to commerce is more important than the Seventh Amendment right
to trial, that workers can be shoved into binding arbitration contracts—a
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very important principle.24 The reason there has been such an erosion of
rights and why binding arbitration is taking over more and more is
because the public does not understand what it is losing, does not
understand that the Seventh Amendment right to trial is part of the
Constitution. There is no one getting that message out. It seems to me
that public interest lawyers really need to learn to communicate
politically in a way that is effective. I think the people on this panel
have learned that over twenty or twenty-five years of experience, and it
is something that somehow has to get back into the law schools.
MATTHEW MYERS:
There is an important lesson in skill development. We go to law
school, and we do not learn to litigate; God knows what we learn in law
school. But at some point early on, we theoretically learn to litigate.
But those of us who work in the public arena do not really have much of
the very same training. How to fashion a message to influence a judge is
very different than how to fashion message to energize a populace—or
to gain credibility with the media, or even to get in the media.
Ralph Nader said this at his Keynote Address; it is now much more
difficult to get the media to cover these sorts of issues. I think many
fewer people watch the news. Many of us do not have a lot of trouble
getting to the media, but what we are not skilled enough at is mass
communication. How do we synthesize our message so it energizes,
how do we synthesize our message so the media will cover us? They
will only give us twenty-five seconds in a sound bite, and we better
make sure that what we say makes sense in those twenty-five seconds.
If we are going to influence the legislative process (which brings me to
my transition in the little time we have left to talk about this), can we do
this work without a broader examination of the electoral process itself
and who is involved and who is not involved? And that goes beyond
campaign finance reform. Charlie, do you want to address that?
CHARLES HALPERN:
Yes, I think that is really where much of our discussion and the
discussion of the panel before us leads. These discussions lead in the
direction of democratic reform. I want to direct your attention to an

24.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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article in the materials by Miles Rapoport25 about the democratic renewal
movement, which he thinks has the potential now in the wake of the
2000 election debacle that it never has had before. He talks about some of
the possibilities of proportional representation or instant runoff voting.
CHARLES HALPERN:
There is an opportunity here and it seems to me that that is the direction
we ought to be going. Miles Rapoport is known to some of you. He was an
organizer in the Northeast and has recently headed a new organization
called Dēmos, a Network of Ideas and Action, an institution which will
be looking at issues of concern to progressives and to the public interest
law community and which will think about where we want to head ten or
fifteen years from now. It is not going to be dealing with the immediate
legislative challenges. They are trying to create a vision of where we are
heading with the idea.
Many of us are living with some version of a “Great Society” or “New
Deal” picture of what the future looks like, which is quite antiquated.
Some of the values that underlie that vision are ones that still animate us.
But they do not take into account globalization and its challenges, they
do not take into account technology, its challenges, and the opportunities
it creates. So as someone said earlier, we need some institutions like the
conservative think tanks that started at this task in 1970. We hope that
Dēmos is going to be such an organization. Ideally, we will, as they
have, become a network of such organizations. But at present we do not
have very much. There is a brief write up of Dēmos in the materials,
and the web site is www.demos-usa.org. It is worth having a look,
because it addresses some of the longer term questions, among them
democratic renewal, that I think our analysis leads toward.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
If I could jump in, I think that Charlie is absolutely right. But I think
at the same time we are missing something about where we are right
now and an immediate step that we need to take. You mentioned the last
panel and the importance of kicking off electoral reform and campaign
finance, but at that panel it almost splintered at the end as to exactly
what that would be. Why was that the case? Because the reality of the
political process tries to splinter us with amendments—to propose
changes to a positive agenda that potentially destroy our own initiatives.
It is not just countering that, which is obviously critical, but what is also
missing here is the problem of the welfare advocates versus the
environmentalists. I think we need to tackle that head on.
25.
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Having experienced twenty to thirty years of the variety of public
interest advocacy that we have been talking about, we have some
understanding of the inherent conflicts between a grassroots approach,
an initiative approach, a legislative lobbying approach, and a legal
strategy in court or regulatory approach. Yet we constantly keep coming
back to the same conflicts: are we not reaching high enough, far enough?
Are we not idealistic enough? Are we cutting a bad deal? Are we
giving away too much? We can never make those issues go away; I
think we need a more structured discussion in our community of how we
approach those issues maturely and intelligently to avoid being
splintered. How do we possibly differ in what our roles are as a grassroots
person, or as someone who focuses on initiatives, or someone who
lobbies the legislature, and agree to maturely disagree—because at
different junctures we need to accomplish some incremental steps while
trying to further the larger message. One thing I have learned above all
in the lobbying process is that when we win, as seldom as it is, we often
lose that in two, three, or four years. It is vulnerable if it is not
sustainable with the grassroots movement or if there is some change in
climate or change in events. Conversely, sometimes when we lose, we
come back stronger two, three, or four years later. We need to build that
incremental, sustained effort into our approach. Unless we can maturely
engage in such continuing strategies, and build the media part onto it and
a litigation strategy with it, we are going to have a difficult time—even
with a long term vision.
MATTHEW MYERS:
You have raised a very difficult problem. The very nature of the
people we attract are zealous idealists. To put them in the legislative
process and ask them to deal with reality and compromise is a
prescription for Maalox. But one of the challenges is to put that mix of
people together to reach the best possible results. On every issue, we
absolutely need the people who will not compromise, who will not bend
a single inch, who will be the clarion call for purity—because that is the
only way we know what the ultimate vision is. But somehow we also
have to train the cadre of people who are capable of going in and helping
us take those step-by-step changes that will get us there. Otherwise, we
will do as we heard the last panel talk about—reach the precipice of
change only to implode on ourselves and not get there.
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GENE KIMMELMAN:
But, my point is, not only do we need both—we need to have both in
the same room talking to each other about how and why both are
significant. It virtually needs to be a curriculum within the public
interest community, a course. It is something that we need everyone to
sit down and do, to figure out what is meaningful incremental change
and what is detrimental incremental change. There will be no one
measurement, obviously. It will be no more scientific than political
science itself, but I think it is an extremely important discussion to have.
We always have it anecdotally or in a particular situation. We never do
it with rigor in our community, and I think until we do that and have
some feeling of respect for the way people approach it, we are going to
have a difficult time getting to some of the bigger goals.
JAMIE COURT:
We just did that in California, putting together the consumer advocates,
labor advocates, environmentalists—a lot of people with different
interests. We had some very long meetings about how we could work
together more effectively to fight our enemies, who seem always to be
on the same page. Rather than simply looking at how we can help each
other in our current causes, we decided to take a look at a new front
legislatively—to choose issues that would legislatively hurt our common
enemies. I think it is vital in Washington and in states where there are
consumer groups, labor groups, and environmentalists, that those
conversations have to occur. Because we are not big coalition builders,
but the value of getting together in the way that these industries have,
can be substantial. Some of the messages from such combinations are
really extraordinary. Look, for instance, at “litigation explosion” and the
“frivolous lawsuit” allegations from the insurance and business PAC
advertising—these words have become part of our culture because every
industry in America uses them and supports them and finances them, and
we do not have a comparable joint effort on our side. So I can just say
from our experience in California that it looks like something really
positive to do.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Some of the division comes from the distinction between lawyers who
litigate, lawyers who are involved in writing legislation, and the
nonlawyer advocates who are writing legislation—and who are relying
on other people. One way to approach it in a training sense would be to
bring people together issue by issue—bring litigators together with
lobbyists and try to train each other on a substantive target. It is cross
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training in a way because, after doing this work for twenty years and
being involved in litigation, we come to understand that those things are
related. But I think when we first start, that is not an obvious point.
Litigators do not realize that the people are up there at the statehouse
working, writing that legislation, and we could possibly fix it there more
effectively. We could have written the law in a different way in the first
place. Again, cross fertilization training would be helpful.
MATTHEW MYERS:
We have sort of rambled; this may be the most difficult session to
organize. The obvious areas of discussion, the rules of the legislature,
those are the sorts of things that we as lawyers are comfortable talking
about. How do we have a more open process? How do we eliminate
institutional bias? Those are some things we did not spend much time
talking about, and I suggest that they are absolutely essential.
At a second level, we have talked about a host of skills that are not
those traditionally taught to public interest lawyers: how to reach out and
build a mass movement, how to communicate with people, and how to
work the electoral process in an effective way.
And the third area relates to the electoral process itself. Unless the
process is more open and participatory, the reality is that we could do all
of our jobs perfectly, and the end product still is not going to be what we
think it ought to be, because legislators will not fear going home to their
constituents, and campaign money will still override the process.
So we are going to have to break down each of those pieces and
recognize that all three are absolutely critical if we are going to move
forward. David?
DAVID VLADECK:
A law school is hosting us; many of the panelists are lawyers. I was
reminded by one of the questions that many of the law schools are now
beginning to have courses on legislative lawyering. CUNY has externships
placing law students in lobbying activities to learn first hand. This poses
two separate questions. To what extent can these lobbying skills be properly
taught in law schools? And what is the proper role of the lawyer in the
legislative process? Our organization at one point quite dogmatically
insisted that our lobbyists be lawyers. We have not come completely
full circle, but we have come ninety percent around. And I think it
would be very interesting to get the panelists’ views on these questions.
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CHARLES HALPERN:
First, I want to be clear about something that we have all talked about:
when we are talking about legislation, public interest lawyers are
involved in a political process. This is something that we have not
always been straight about with our funders or ourselves. Now going
back to my life as an ex-funder, I am aware that many foundations are
antsy about advocacy and terrified about lobbying. Many sophisticated
foundation executives think that no foundation dollars can be used for
lobbying, which, as you all know, is completely erroneous.
So I think part of our job as educators is to help educate funders and
also nonprofits. There are many nonprofits that think they cannot lobby.
They are not likely to be represented here, but they need to understand
that they can elect under § 501(h)26 and have quite a safe harbor for their
lobbying activities. So I think we should be playing that role.
As for the role of lawyers, I am not hopeful about training lawyers.
As a former legal educator, training lawyers to craft punchy messages
that really resonate with the voters is problematical. There is too much
in our training and background handicapping that skill. I think some
things can be taught, but teaching those skills to lawyers is very difficult,
with some exceptions.
What seems to me to be missing is something that the conservatives
have done so brilliantly, through an organization that they call the
Federalist Society. It helps, from their point of view, to bring together
law professors, activists, and law students; it becomes the recruiting
system, and it provides roles for different people. For the real zealous
idealists, there is a role for them; for the people who are just vaguely
interested in supporting this kind of work, it does it for them. We have
nothing comparable to that. So as we get clearer about what lawyers can
learn and should learn to be effective public interest lawyers, it would be
well for us to put together some sort of organization in which we all
interact, including not only public interest lawyers but also law
professors.
I had an odd experience when I was in residence at NYU Law School
a couple of months ago. We were getting involved with the estate tax
fight—another issue in which all of us have a real stake. The estate tax,
as you know, is paid by less than two percent of all Americans. Yet,
partly because it was renamed the death tax by its opponents, the idea of
repealing the estate tax has developed a tremendous purchase. I walked
down the part of the law school corridor where all the tax professors
have their offices, and I had a conversation out in the corridor with one
26.
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of them, a former IRS commissioner. He thought it was a disaster to
have this thing repealed, but he had in no way communicated this to
anybody. People started coming out of their offices, and they also were
opposed to the repeal of the estate tax. One professor had just finished a
law review article, which was being edited for the New York University
Law Review, about how important the estate tax is in the overall
structure of our tax system. So what I was able to do was to call up Gary
Bass and get these guys, and they were all guys, plugged into this effort
to oppose the repeal of the estate tax. There has been a sea of change in
attitude on the repeal of the estate tax in the last four weeks, partly
triggered by the very brilliant piece of public interest advocacy headed
by Warren Buffet and Bill Gates, Sr., of all people, which is a reminder
of the kind of ingenuity that we have to exercise. The point is to bring
the professors into some kind of setting with people who have similar
concerns. It is an interesting task in which we public interest lawyers
might take a lead.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
I just wanted to comment on David’s question. I think a course may
be nice, but doing this kind of public interest advocacy requires an
apprenticeship, a fellowship, it requires on-the-job training. It is
difficult to make the abstract issues involved in rules meaningful until
you are actually in a legislative process and feel and experience it. So I
think that is critical. I would like to get a list of people who would sign
up for such a course to know who to target for a fellowship.
I am one of the people who has probably come full circle on the
question of lawyers and lobbying, because I started out feeling strongly
that lobbyists should be attorneys. I do not feel that way now. I think
the single criterion is exceptional analytical ability. Those who are
really sharp can figure out what the constitutional issues are, why
legislative language matters, and where it fits in with regulatory matters.
Law school is not necessary for that; a lot of people who go to law
school don’t do that.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Can I just add one thing? In one place I disagree with Charlie. I think
all lawyers would benefit from learning how to speak in a way that
would influence legislators, because it is the sort of English that we
ought to be using in the courtroom as well.
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DAVID VLADECK:
It will take a ten-page disclaimer before you open your mouth. I
would point to the energy emergency here. The question in the materials
notes that it seems to take a crisis to provoke a legislative response these
days. I think the question really has two parts: is that observation
correct? And, if so, what does that say about our legislative process?
GENE KIMMELMAN:
I think it is correct. I was sitting there listening to Ralph Nader and
thinking about healthcare. The majority of the American people want
something for the uninsured, for prescription drugs, for managed-care
consumer protection, and for privacy protection. You can go through a
whole list where there is clear majority support. Why isn’t it happening?
Well, there are a lot of reasons, but one is the lack of intensity. So a
crisis has that element of intensity. Yet, a crisis isn’t even necessarily
enough, because we will end up with some patchwork fix. Take
energy—to the extent Congress has finally awakened and thinks there is
a federal problem, it will be “just get me through this summer without
brownouts.” I think that is where we are.
My reaction to what Ralph said was that, in addition to where he was
going with new institutions, we can take crises and figure out how to
mobilize people while they are so focused. Electricity is an example. It
is our campaign finance system that gave us these laws. It is a travesty
involving corporate power and avoidance of responsibility. It gives us
an opportunity to talk about the impossibility of deregulation in certain
areas and the fundamental problems with deregulation. It does not just
have to be electricity; fly on an airplane or look at a cable television bill.
There are broader issues that can immediately be raised. We should try
to build something out of it so we can ask: “what is the next chapter
reachable through this challenge?”
WENDY WENDLANDT:
That is true. Crises can be an opportunity for us; it is a terrible
opportunity, but it provides an opening—it is on the public agenda. The
legislature is actually poised to act. They feel like they have to do
something—not always good, but at least something. But I think it is a
mistake to get into the mindset that a crisis is the only way we can get
reform. I think concerted campaigns by public interest groups with
institutional support can work. The point of institutions is to have an
entity to continue working day after day. It should not just mobilize in
case of a crisis. I know Congress is a whole different beast on this score,
but with concerted effort and focus at the state level, you can pass
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legislation. We have all kinds of examples. It has become more
difficult to do this, but taking a piece of legislation and working it
through the process—from getting it written, the right sponsors, the right
committee, the right testimony, the right endorsers, the whole
campaign—it can be done. We, as the public interest community, can
set the agenda. But it requires us to have more political power than we
have now to do it on a wide range of issues.
MATTHEW MYERS:
The nature of the political process is such that the hard reforms against
the special interests are much more difficult without a crisis. There is no
question about that. It is also true that a crisis is almost always not
enough if we are not poised to take advantage of it. The energy crisis in
California becomes real if we put a face on it. Think of all the senior
citizens on fixed incomes who have been crushed by the energy crisis.
They are the face of that crisis. If they were the face of the campaign to
do something about it, there would be a different result. It is not just an
esoteric debate about energy and an occasional brownout.
We have seen occasions where we have missed the crisis opportunity,
for example, gun control in Columbine. If we are not poised to figure
out where we want to go and how to do it, we can have a massive crisis
and not be ready to use it for the public good. What is happening now
with the shootings in schools and the lack of response is appalling. But I
think Wendy also makes an important point: we cannot let ourselves off
the hook. We cannot wait for a crisis in order to be able to move. We
need to figure out strategies to develop the support. Campaign finance
reform is being debated on the floor of the Senate today, not because
there was a crisis, but because there was a sustained strategy to do it.
Anybody who has done this work realizes that we can mobilize that
broad public support with clever messages and by organizing to build
intensity, not in all fifty states, but in targeted places. So we cannot let
ourselves off the hook by waiting for a crisis.
JAMIE COURT:
There is nothing anybody in this room is working on that they do not
think is a crisis. The issue is: how do you make everyone else understand
that it is a crisis? There was a crisis with HMOs long before anyone saw
a Patients’ Bill of Rights. We ran a campaign where, for five months, we
faxed a different picture and story of an HMO victim who did not have a
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remedy. We sent it to Congress every day, every morning. They got it.
The repetition educates the community. I think that one of the problems
is a body of knowledge we really have in our day-to-day work. I do not
think that we really understand that the public doesn’t receive it. I do
not think that we understand the degree to which they don’t receive it.
MATTHEW MYERS:
That is why that picture that you were sending to the legislature—if
you’d been sending it to the local newspaper and citizens’ groups—the
communications go both ways. You probably did, I’m sure.
JAMIE COURT:
We did. We mostly faxed it to the media folks, and they picked up
some of these stories, and that is how it got a face. In fact, when they
openly debated HMO reform in Congress, a lot of those pictures were
blown up on the floor, and those stories were told. It becomes
something that no one can vote against.
I will give you an example of the difference between having a crisis
and not. In 1998 proposition 9 would have stopped a lot of the
deregulation bills.27 That was the energy initiative our group sponsored;
we got a very low percentage of the vote. If there were an initiative on
the ballot tomorrow, it would pass. So the degree to which we harness
an existing crisis is another issue. When they get to that level of
visibility there’s a lot of possibility.
DAVID VLADECK:
Jamie’s last point is the segue into the next question. Accepting the
premise that there is a growing concentration in the media, how much
more difficult does that make your job? You need to convince an editor
that there is a story here. If there are only two or three networks and
there are only six or seven national newspapers, does it make it that
much more difficult for your message to get across?
GENE KIMMELMAN:
I think that is where we are going and on two fundamental levels.
First, it is not just the concentration of the media, but their ancillary
connections. Let’s take the name of a company: AOL-Time Warner.
You think of all of the holdings—a vast web ranging from Internet to
programming to cable properties, on through to the software world.
Now, beyond the normal problem of the media just wanting to do what
27. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 40–43 (1998), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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is easy, how much interference with editorial control do these conflicts
portend? After fitting their model for the eight-second sound bite, there
is a new barrier: how much will they want to cover issues involving their
own company? I think journalists themselves worry about this. Add to
this layer that the media still relies dramatically on advertising revenue.
What leverage do those advertisers have beyond the immediate
corporate interest of that media company itself? Where does the media
firm have its investments? These are the people who bankroll a lot of
what they put out there. What if they start wanting to pull back?
If there are more companies with different strategies, with different
corporate bases, with a different view of what their mission is in the
media, I think invariably we are going to do better. So I think at the rate
we are going with the current political process and with the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals recently overturning some cable ownership limits,28 a
few more major mergers will lead us to such a tight oligopoly that it will
be very dependent on those few owners and their attitudes.
JAMIE COURT:
We do not really have a problem selling stories, but the problem is
that there are not that many stories that can be sold. The rules of
engagement are so narrow, and there are many issues that cannot be
furthered in the media and that are left out.
Has anyone watched CNN lately since the merger? You will see now
that the center of the Morning Show is the Internet. It’s a character.
They have a big screen up, and they go to the Internet. This is a
company now owned by AOL, and they are encouraging Internet use.
So half the stories on the Morning Show now are about the Internet. We
have to play by those rules; so it is definitely a problem in terms of the
breadth of the debate and what issues can be raised.
MATTHEW MYERS:
David, let me just say that this reality is our challenge. We should be
talking about how we are going to communicate with large numbers of
people given the reality of media concentration and bias, even while we
worry about what to do about that reality. Therefore, we need to be
developing improved strategies to use the Internet and other grassroots
28. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 240 F.3d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
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mechanisms. If, in fact, AOL-Time Warner decides they do not want to
cover our issue or they do not want to cover it when we want them to
cover it, we still have built up a network and a means of communication
that are not as dependent on them as we have traditionally been. I think
we can do that, but we need to be creative. Again, not another skill they
teach in law school.
DAVID VLADECK:
I want to switch gears for a moment. There is a question from a law
student who is prompted by something that Wendy said about the way
that law students view public interest opportunities. To make a very
long question short—apart from a few fellowships, how does one break
into public interest law, particularly public interest law that has a
legislative component to it? Wendy, why don’t you take the first crack
at this?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I spend time recruiting graduating law students to come do work for
PIRG—and some of them are attorneys, some are not; we have mixed
feelings about it. People have noted we have to beat out of young
lawyers some of the things they are taught in law school. But it is
possible, it has happened. So we definitely hire graduating law students
to do advocacy.
In an organization like PIRG, with about 400 staff members around
the country, having attorneys on staff is important; everything from
serving as legal counsel to the program side, being in the legislature,
helping to write the laws and craft them so they pass muster if later
tested in court. So PIRG certainly hires graduating law students, and I
know that we are one of the few organizations willing to take people and
train them. We have a fairly rigorous training program to teach people.
But then, as Gene said, it is really on-the-job training, learning how to do
it. I know that there are not that many other organizations. But my
advice is: find the organizations that do what you like and intern with
them in the summers. I know that means less money, but there are
fellowships out there. Get the experience. Some of those other
organizations that would not traditionally hire somebody right out of law
school will hire you if you worked there for the summer. But I leave
that to my fellow panelists to confirm.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
We have just instituted a fellowship program. We only have one slot
now in our Washington, D.C. office. Our San Francisco office has
traditionally had fellowships. Our Texas office has tried. What we are
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trying to do now is to go to foundations to support the training of
advocates. I have one slot created that way through a Ford Foundation
grant in telecommunications. So it is very difficult, but we are trying to
make some opportunities available, and there ought to be a lot more.
This is one of the areas requiring foundation help.
JAMIE COURT:
We are hiring. I would say to the law students that there are so few
public interest lawyers in America that if you work really hard and really
care, you can make a big difference. It is one of the few professions you
could go into where you get your phone, your computer, your territory,
and you can change an awful lot of lives. It is really worth doing.
MATTHEW MYERS:
David, there is a piece of it that no one has mentioned. There are an
enormous number of good legislators, people who are trying to do the
right thing, who are looking for staff on a regular basis.
JAMIE COURT:
Did you say an enormous number?
MATTHEW MYERS:
Nationwide, you add them all up together and there are a dozen or so.
No, there really are, and there are terrific opportunities working with a
legislator—with somebody inside the process. It is a different way of being an
advocate. But do not kid yourself, the amount of good that can be done and
the skills that can be developed in that process are often very substantial.
JAMIE COURT:
But if the legislator frustrates you, do not think that is really the public
interest world. The games played as a legislative aide often times are not
the games played in the public interest world. There is a big difference. I
do think it is a good learning experience, but you have to be careful whom
you choose.
DAVID VLADECK:
I have two questions about the democratic process. I would like to
direct at least the first to Charlie. Both questions ask about the renewal
of democracy. One asks the question about whether other means of
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voting, such as to try to get away from the winner takes all theory of our
electoral system, might ultimately improve the electoral process. The
other question asks a related question: voters are having a difficult time
identifying candidates who genuinely have public interest roots. There
is no truth in advertising when it comes to political candidates. What
measures do you think can be used, other than those the Supreme Court
recently struck down regarding term limits, so voters have a better sense
of where candidates stand on issues that are important to them?
CHARLES HALPERN:
This is the moment for serious public debate about a range of
alternatives, such as the multimember district, proportional representation
and the like, also electronic voting, the idea of an election day
holiday—a forty-eight-hour voting period which would make it easier
for people to get to the polls, and same day registration—where you can
register on election day. Six states now have same day registration in
place29 and, not surprisingly, they are among the states with the highest
voter participation. So there is a lot of experimentation that can be done,
and I think it is very much in the interest of all public interest lawyers to
participate in that experimental process.
With regard to truth in advertising in the electoral process, my first
impulse is to have a kind of a First Amendment response, because that is a
hazardous business to try to police. I would go very slowly toward doing
that. Tracy Weston in Santa Monica has pioneered a very interesting
system of getting fuller information available about candidates on the
Internet. He has an ingenious system that he has been working out over
the last few years. That seems to be a good idea, and then voters will have
a richer information base on which to make their own judgments.
DAVID VLADECK:
I have one last question. Would it be helpful to open the lawmaking
process by creating an Internet file for each bill where people could
register their views on it?
WENDY WENDLANDT:
Sure, that would be great. Let’s do it!
DAVID VLADECK:
Do you see any impediments to doing it? Do you think the
legislatures in your states would warmly embrace this kind of proposal?
29. The six states are: Maine, Minnesota, Idaho, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
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WENDY WENDLANDT:
They would hate it.
MATTHEW MYERS:
As a concept, it is a terrific idea. Anything that allows the public to
communicate directly and effectively helps. I don’t think we should kid
ourselves about how quickly the corporate world would also figure out
how to use it and would flood it—as they did with the 800 numbers. So
the concept of allowing more direct, frequent, and effective communication
is a vitally important one, but it needs to be thought about carefully.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I was reading a story the other day about the volume of e-mail that
Congress receives, and the percentage that is responded to or even read
now is incredibly small. So that is the problem with e-mail; there is a
sort of tally system about how many come in, but as soon as its
importance is reduced to numbers, it is easy for somebody to just send
out a manipulated and false registration of public will.
MATTHEW MYERS:
You know, David, if you remember when we were doing the McCain
tobacco legislation in 1998, the tobacco companies spent tens of millions
of dollars to flood congressional offices. So it’s a system that can be
worked for both good and bad.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
I can’t think of a bill I ever worked on in Congress where it ever went
to a vote without having a substitute amendment introduced hours, if not
minutes, before it was actually brought up for consideration. It could be
a change in five words or it could be entirely different. So the obstacles
are enormous to achieving the public input goal.
MATTHEW MYERS:
Let me give each of the panelists just one minute to wrap up. Wendy,
why don’t you start.
WENDY WENDLANDT:
I want to talk about two things in closing. One of which I have said
throughout, which is “little d” democracy. I think there is a real danger
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that the public interest community forgets its roots and forgets that our
power is with the people. The more the process, at whatever stage, puts
power in the hands of the people, the better it is for us.
The second thing is that the challenge of our work is largely about
building institutions that can continue to take on these issues as they
come up. I work on the genetic engineering issue a lot. We did not even
know that issue existed fifteen years ago. Suddenly, it is an important
issue, and having institutions that can take on issues year after year as
they arise is extremely important. Those are my two closing thoughts.
GENE KIMMELMAN:
On top of institution building, which I do think is critical, we are
missing a tremendous opportunity to try to develop greater intensity to
the public, not just in crisis, but regarding things we know people care
about. We need to bring them into the process. So what we need to do
is to reach out to the institutions that exist. To reach out to people who
identify themselves by family, we need to appeal to the interests of their
children or their parents that they care about. We need to reach out to
people who identify themselves ethnically, people who identify
themselves through community leaders, through religion. We need to
make our message fit with how those people perceive themselves.
Otherwise, I do not think our institutions will work.
CHARLES HALPERN:
I would like to see steps taken to build a greater sense of community
in the public interest law world. We need the kind of institutional
network in the public interest law world that will increase our long term
capacity, our capacity to renew ourselves by recruiting and training new
people. I would like to see us in the public interest law world try to
assure a contemplative dimension in our work, in our institutions, and in
our personal lives so that our zeal to do good does not lead us to trample
the kinds of behavior that are important to our own well being, to our
families, and, in the long term, to the cause that we want to serve.
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JAMIE COURT:
I think we need to work together to build capacity, to share messages,
and to build messages. We have many different skills in this
community, and when we take on a legislative agenda, we have to cover
all the components: the meeting, the message, and the lobby. Sometimes
litigation is a big part of that. Sometimes we can file cases that further
an issue. We have to find ways to build capacity and to work together.
Then the big thing we really need to think about is the message—
finding a new vocabulary to communicate to this world that has been
overrun with corporate messages for twenty-five years, messages that
have been unanswered. We need to find a way to answer Ralph’s
question: how do we talk about corporate expansion and the taking over
of social rules, ethical customs, and the law? Until we find that
vocabulary, we are going to be on the treadmill; so, when we find it, I
hope we all use it.
MATTHEW MYERS:
I think the fact that we have devoted so much of this session to
something other than talking about the rules of change is an honest
and accurate reflection of the relative importance of the different
issues we have discussed.
I have two specific closing thoughts, including one we have not
even mentioned. But given the hybrid nature of influencing the
legislative process, it is important. It is directly tied to the real
democratic process: we as a public interest law movement need to
look more like America. We need to look less White, less male. We
need to, as the earlier topic on campaign finance reform noted, not be
“doing for others,” but rather all working together. That needs to be
a high priority and one that would lead toward Charlie’s goal of a
public interest community.
Finally, I think we do have to remember the critical fact that, even
more than in the judicial process or the agency process, legislatures
are guided by an electoral system that involves winning over a broad
base of support from a large number of people. That lodestar is
essential for the kind of public interest change we want. It is
absolutely critical even for sustaining the agency change or the
changes we want in the courtrooms, because it is too easy to overturn
them if we do not cover the broader base. As public interest lawyers,
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whether our skills fit the courtroom or the legislative arena, the
broader lessons of this session need to be front and center in all the
work we do.
I want to thank the panelists, who I felt were terrific, and I
appreciate everything you brought to the session today.
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